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CERTAIN 1966 KEY RULINGS BY THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE-

and

Procedures Regarding Letter Rulings and
Requests for Technical Advice
HAROLD

T.

SWARTZ

Assistant Commissioner (Technical) Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Service has published so far in 1966 over 340
Revenue Rulings in its weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin.
A determination of which of these rulings are "key" rulings would
depend on the reader and his particular interest in the matter involved.
For purposes of this Conference, I have selected some of the Revenue
Rulings that seemed to me to have created the most interest in our
office where they were being considered.
One of these was Revenue Ruling 66-284 published in September.
This ruling holds that a statutory merger of two corporations will
qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a) (1) (F) of the Code
even though some of the shareholders do not participate. Eight years
ago in Revenue Ruling 58-422 the Service held that section 368(a) (1)
(F) applies to all reorganizations where there is no change in existing
shareholders or in the assets of the corporation involved.
In Revenue Ruling 66-284 we had a corporation that for good
business reasons wanted to reincorporate in another State. It organized
a new corporation in that State and then merged itself into the new
corporation. However, shareholders of the old corporation owning less
than one percent of the outstanding shares of the old corporation voted
against the merger. These dissenting shareholders received payment
equal to the fair value of their shares.
The question presented was whether the transaction, which qualified
as a reorganization under section 368(a) (1) (A), also qualified as an
(F) reorganization.
The result the taxpayer desired was that it not be required to file
a partial year return under section 381 (b) of the Code which it would
have to do under an (A) reorganization.
Revenue Ruling 66-284 holds that the failure of shareholders owning less than one percent of the outstanding shares to participate in
the merger was such a de minimis change that it did not serve to
disqualify it as an (F) reorganization. Therefore, under section 381 (b)
the portions of the taxable year both prior to and after the reorganiza-
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tion constituted a single taxable year for the new corporation. Accordingly, the old corporation was spared the trouble of closing its books,
taking inventories, and so forth, on the date of the merger.
Also in September, the Service's attention was called to a much
advertised arrangement known as "leased life insurance". Here, the
owner of a life insurance policy assigns the policy to a leasing company, retaining the right to designate the beneficiary. The company
then leases the policy back to the assignor for a level annual charge
and the company pays the annual insurance premium and promises
to pay the face amount of the policy to the beneficiary if the insured
dies during the term of the agreement.
The question was whether a portion of the annual charge was deductible by the lessee as interest.
Revenue Ruling 66-298 holds that no part of the payment is interest
because actually no indebtedness existed.
We had some casualty loss questions presented which resulted in
several Revenue Rulings during 1966.
In Revenue Ruling 66-303 it was held that where a prolonged
drought causes damage or loss from progressive deteriorations, such
as to trees or shrubs ultimately killed from lack of water, the loss is
not deductible as a causualty loss under section 165(c) (3) of the Code.
It was held that there was no sudden identifiable event fixing a point at
which loss to the owner can be measured.
However, because there had been no published position by the
Service on this question prior to Revenue Ruling 66-303 and there had
been some confusion relating to the Service's position in connection with
some old court decisions, the ruling was not applied to losses from an
unusual and prolonged drought prior to January 1, 1966.
In another casualty loss question, the Service held, in Revenue Ruling
66-242, that a loss cannot be based on a hypothetical economic decline
in value of the property based on an estimate of future buyer resistance,
and in Revenue Ruling 66-9 it was held that where timber is destroyed
by a hurricane, the casualty loss may not exceed the adjusted basis
for determining loss from the sale or other disposition of the quantity
of timber which is found unfit for use because of the hurricane.
In January of 1966, we published four Revenue Rulings setting forth
the position of the Service regarding the qualification of employees'
pension and profit-sharing plans under section 401 of the Code.
These rulings applied particularly to plans which by their terms
are limited only to salaried employees.
As you know-our District offices issue determination letters under
section 401-and the National Office had had many requests for advice
from the Districts asking for some guidelines in this area.
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As a result, we published Revenue Rulings 66-12; 66-13; 66-14; and
66-15 which set forth several examples of factual situations where the
eligibility requirements of the plan resulted in either qualification or
non-qualification.
One of the rulings holds that a plan under certain circumstances may
qualify under section 401(a) even though it covers only salaried employees to the exclusion of hourly paid employees.
In another factual situation, a plan was held not to qualify whereby reason of limiting the coverage to only salaried and clerical employees-it resulted in benefitting only two highly compensated officers
and shareholders.
In another factual situation where a profit-sharing plan was limited
to salaried employees because its unionized employees chose not to
participate-it was held that the plan failed of qualification because
the limited coverage resulted in benefitting primarily employees who
were highly paid officers and shareholders.
The fourth situation involved a plan which, although covering both
salaried and wage earning employees, provided for higher comparable
benefits for its salaried employees than it did for its hourly paid employees. Here, the salaried plan could not have qualified by itself as
being non-discriminatory. The mere fact that it provided for some
benefits for the hourly paid did not serve to qualify the salaried plan.
The plan for the hourly paid-of course-was held to qualify.
However, if this salaried plan had had sufficient coverage to qualify
alone-it would not have mattered if the plan for the wage earners
had smaller benefits. Obviously, if it could qualify without providing
any benefits at all for the hourly workers-it shouldn't be disqualified
if it at least provided some benefits.
In October of this year we published two Revenue Rulings in connection with whether organizations are exempt from Federal income
tax which borrow funds for the purpose of acquiring oil and gas
production payments from properties in which there is no ownership
of working interests. The question was whether or not this activity
constituted the conduct of a trade or business for profit.
For example-an organization organized exclusively for charitable
purposes obtained funds for its operations principally through the
acquisition, with borrowed money, of oil and gas production payments.
There was a spread of around one percent between the so-called interest
equivalent factor paid in connection with each oil production payment
-and the interest paid on the borrowed funds.
The Service has held in the past that this constituted a trade or
business that served to cause the organization to be taxable-or an
unrelated business activity. The issue, however, was litigated and the
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courts have uniformly held that-under the facts and circumstancesthe purchase of oil production payments by an organization--otherwise
qualified for exemption under section 501(a) of the Code--does not
constitute the conduct of a trade or business for profit.
Therefore, Revenue Rulings 66-295 and 66-296 announced that the
Service will follow these court decisions and held that engaging in this
type of transaction does not effect the organization's exempt status.
We had quite a number of inquiries resulting from the Excise Tax
Reduction Act of 1965.
One of these had to do with the manufacturers tax on Motor
Vehicles.
Prior to the amendments made by this Act-automobiles, trucks,
and other automobiles, were taxed at the same rate. So it was unnecessary
to distinguish between them, for tax rate purposes.
The Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 amended section 4061 (a) of
the Code to impose lower rates of tax on automobiles than on automobile trucks and busses.
One of the questions asked was whether a "Jeep"; a "Bronco"; or
a "Scout" was a truck or an automobile.
In Revenue Ruling 66-308 it was held that certain models of these
vehicles were automobiles and therefore subject to the lower rate of
tax.
It was recognized that the bodies of these vehicles have capabilities
related to either classification.
For example-some of the chassis could be obtained with optional
seating arrangements with various removable tops.
The Revenue Ruling describes these various models and-in general
-says that if the top has side windows and a top covering the front
and back seat area, it is designed primarily for passenger carrying and
is an automobile-but-if the top covers only the front seat area-the
area behind the front seat being available for cargo carrying-it is a
truck.
There is a further complication because of the interchangeability of
the various types of tops and enclosures-so that the classification of a
particular vehicle can be changed by the retail dealer. So, if the dealer
purchasees from the manufacturer a vehicle classed as an automobile
and then installs a truck-type cab enclosure-he is considered to be
the manufacturer of a truck taxable at the higher rate.
One of our publications during 1966 on which we received very
favorable comments from tax practitioners was not a Revenue Ruling,
but a Revenue Procedure.
This is in connection with certain operating rules that we follow in
issuing rulings letters as to the tax consequences of corporate reorganl.
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zations-liquidations-stock dividends and redemptions-exchanges and
distributions-and the like.
Our Reorganization Branch has developed certain operating rules for
determining whether a ruling will be issued in certain types of cases.
For example-section 354(b) (1) (A), 368(a) (1) (C), and 368(a) (2)
(B) contain the phrases "substantially all of the assets" or "substantially
all of the properties" and section 1.368-1 (b) of the Regulations refers
to "continuity of interest."
In issuing ruling letters on requests for advance rulings in these
areas, the Branch had adopted what were termed "rules of thumb" for
purposes of determining whether a ruling letter would be issued or
whether it would decline to rule.
Tax practitioners-for some time-have been asking the Service to
publish these "rules of thumb" so that they could be of some assistance
to them in preparing ruling requests.
So, in August of 1966, we published Revenue Procedure 66-34 which
announced some of the operating rules.
That Procedure says that the "substantially all" requirement is
satisfied if there is a transfer of assets representing at least 90 percent
of the fair market value of the net assets-and at least 70 percent of
the fair market value of the gross assets-held by the corporation
immediately prior to the transfer.
The Procedure says further that the "continuity of interest" requirement is satisfied if there is a continuing interest through stock ownership
in the acquiring (or transferee corporation) on the part of the former
shareholders of the acquired (or transferor corporation) which is equal
in value-as of the effective date of the reorganization-to at least
50 percent of the value of all of the formerly outstanding stock of
the acquired or transferor corporation as of the same date.
Two years ago in Revenue Procedure 64-3 1, the Service announced
that it would not issue letter rulings under section 331 of the Code in
connection with the tax effect of a liquidation of a corporation-preceded or followed by the reincorporation of all or a part of the business
-where the shareholders of the liquidating corporation own more than
a nominal amount of the stock of the new transferee corporation-nor
would we issue rulings where a liquidation is followed by the sale of
the corporate's assets by the shareholders to another corporation in
which such shareholders own more than a nominal amount of the
stock.
We had also announced that we would not issue ruling letters in
connection with the application of section 337 to gains realized by a
corporation upon the sale of property, in connection with its liquidation, to another corporation, where more than a nominal amount of the
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stock of both the selling corporation and the purchasing corporation
are owned by the same persons.
It is obvious what question then arose in the minds of tax practitioners
who desired rulings on those types of transactions. Just what does the
Service mean by a "nominal amount."
So, we announced in Revenue Rrocedure 66-34 that for purposes of
issuing ruling letters-the term "nominal amount" is deemed to be 20
percent in value.
The same Revenue Procedure announces a "rule of thumb" in con.
nection with letter rulings on a distribution and redemption of "section
306 stock" as to whether such disposition or redemption is pursuant to
a plan of tax avoidance.
The Procedure says that:
(1) if the stock is widely held, and
(2) the stock is not-by its terms-redeemable for at least five years
from the date of issuance-and
(3) it is represented that there will be no redemption of the stockby tender or otherwise-within the five-year period-then a
ruling will usually be issued under section 306(b) (4) that the
distribution is not pursuant to a plan of tax avoidance.
We have some other similar Revenue Procedures in the mill for
publication which we expect to be of considerable assistance to taxpayers in preparing requests for rulings.
For example-we expect to publish a set of rules that the Service
usually follows in connection with rulings under section 367.
Section 217 of the Code, relating to moving expenses, allows a deduction to an employee for reasonable expenses paid for moving his
household goods and personal effects from his former residence to his
new residence.
We had several inquiries as to whether this included the moving of
a household pet that belonged to the employee or to a member of his
household.
In Revenue Ruling 66-305 we held that it did.
It wasn't clear whether the pet was considered to be household goods
-a personel effect-or a member of the household-but the Ruling
made it clear that the cost of moving the pet was deductible.
Several days after the Ruling was published we received an envelope
addressed to the Commissioner containing merely a copy of the Revenue
Ruling and a picture of an elephant.
Since there was no return address-we haven't yet ruled whether an
elephant is--or is not-a household pet.
There were--of course-many others of the Revenue Rulings pub-
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lished during 1966 that could be designated "key" rulings, but in the
interest of time, I will go into my second topic which is:
Procedures Regarding Letter Rulings and Requests for
Technical Advice
I am sure that many of you are familiar with these procedures so I
will merely touch on some of the more important aspects.
There are three types of what might be called formal rulings. That
is-rulings that may be considered as official holdings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
First-Ruling letters-These are written statements issued by the
National Office to taxpayers or their authorized representatives in
answer to their questions relating to the effect of the tax laws on a
specifically described transaction based on a specific set of facts.
Second-Closing Agreements-These are a more formal expression
of the tax consequences of specific transactions. Closing Agreements are
entered into pursuant to section 7121 of the Code and they are binding
on both the taxpayer and the Commissioner, except upon a showing
of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact.
Third-Published Rulings-These are called Revenue Rulings and
constitute an official interpretation by the Service which has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
In some instances a taxpayer is required by the law or regulations
to obtain a ruling from the Commissioner before he can proceed with
certain transactions or take certain actions without adverse tax effects.
For example, a taxpayer in most instances is not permitted to change
his accounting method or his accounting period without first obtaining
permission from the Commissioner. Also, under section 367 of the Code,
a taxpayer must establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that
certain transfers or exchanges relating to foreign corporations are not in
pursuance of a plan having one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of Federal income taxes-and I point out-that under section 367, a
taxpayer must get a ruling before he makes the transfer in order to
obtain the benefits of that section.
Requests by taxpayers for rulings may apply to transactions already
consummated, but prior to the filing of a return. In such cases, the
taxpayer wants to know how to treat the transaction on his tax return.
However, he may be only contemplating a transaction and he desires
to know what will happen taxwise if he consummates the transaction.
A ruling to the taxpayer with adverse tax results might, of course,
cause him to refrain from completing the transaction.
The bulk of the rulings issued to taxpayers by the National Office of
the Internal Revenue Service are those under which a taxpayer desires
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an advance opinion of the tax effect of a transaction before he proceeds to consummate the transaction.
A good example of this would be in connection with a corporate
merger, liquidation, or distribution.
Or he may want to know whether a sale of certain property will
result in a capital gain or ordinary income before he proceeds with the
sale. If the answer is "ordinary income," he may not sell.
Or before an employer establishes a pension or profit-sharing plan
for his employees, he usually seeks the approval of the Service in advance of final adoption of the plan as to whether it meets the requirements of the Code as a qualified plan. The reason for this is obvious.
The tax penalties resulting from such a plan not qualifying under the
Code are too severe for him to take the chance of putting it into effect
without advance approval.
Rulings on contemplated transactions are, in general, issued only
by the National Office. However, the local District offices have authority
to issue what are called "determination letters."
Perhaps I should discuss briefly the jurisdictions of the National
Office and the District Directors' Offices in issuing "rulings" and
"determination letters."
The National Office issues rulings on prospective transactions and on
completed transactions where the tax return involving the transaction
is not yet due or filed. However, rulings will not ordinarily be issued
where the same issue is pending before an Appellate Division or if the
issue is involved in a prior year's return.
District Directors issue determination letters to taxpayers located in
their Districts on consummated transactions but only if the answer to
the question is specifically covered by the law, regulations, court decisions or published rulings. They also issue determination letters on
the qualification of plans under section 401 of the Code and on the
exempt status of certain organizations under section 501 of the Code.
There are, however, certain areas where--because of the inherently
factual nature of the problems involved--or for other reasons-the
Service will not issue advance rulings or determination letters.
For example-we will not answer hypothetical questions. Nor will
we rule in advance on transactions which lack bona fide business purpose and have as their principal purpose the reduction of Federal taxes.
We do not ordinarily rule where the determination is primarily one of
fact such as the fair market value of property or transfers in contemplation of death.
We do not rule on the prospective application of the Federal estate
tax to the estate-or the property of a living person. This is because we
cannot know when there will be a taxpayer-that is-an estate-nor
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do we know what the law in effect will be at that time there is an estate.
So-the I.R.S. does not examine wills or trust instruments for the purpose of giving specific legal advice on the possible future estate tax
consequences.
However, in response to inquiries as to the application of the Federal
estate tax, we try to be helpful in pointing out pertinent provisions of
the statute and regulations and any relevant court decisions, together
with a general statement of the position of the Service.
However, with respect to Federal gift taxes-we will generally rule
as to the prospective effect of prospective gifts to be completed within
the current year.
In such cases-we require a full statement of all of the facts involved
-including a complete copy of any trust instrument or other document
by which the proposed transfer by gift is to be affected-and the date
it is expected that the gift will be completed.
If the request involves an actuarial valuation question we will need
to know the exact ages of all parties involved.
Procedures and instructions regarding requests for rulings or determination letters have been published officially as Revenue Procedure No.
62-28, C.B. 1962-2,496. (NOTE: Since this paper was delivered, these
procedures have been republished as Revenue Procedure No. 67-1,
I.R.B. 1967-1, January 3, 1967.)
It would be well for those who are not familiar with this procedure
to read it before preparing a request for a ruling.
Section 6 of the Procedure sets forth what a taxpayer should submit
with his request for a ruling.
For example-the request must contain a complete statement of facts
relating to the transaction such as names and addresses of all interested
parties, the district office where each files its return, a full and precise
statement of the business reasons for the transaction, and true copies
of all documents involved in the transaction.
If the taxpayer is contending for a particular determination, he must
furnish an explanation of the grounds for his contensions, together with
a statement of the relevant law, regulations, or court cases in support
of his views. Even if he is urging no particular determination, he must
state his views of the tax results and the authorities therefor.
The request must be signed by the taxpayer or his authorized representative.
A request for a ruling by the National Office should be addressed to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Washington, D.C., 20224. A
request for a determination letter should be addressed to the District
Director for the district in which the taxpayer files his return.
It is important for you to follow these procedures and instructions.
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It will expedite the consideration of your request for your ruling.
Now-what is the effect of a ruling letter?
Can the taxpayer rely on it?
Is it binding on the Revenue Agent?
Well-of course-no ruling is legally binding unless it is issued under
the statutory closing agreement procedures. Rulings other than closing
agreements can be revoked by the Service.
However, the Service has stated in its published rules of procedure,
that, except in rare and unusual circumstances, a ruling issued to a
particular taxpayer will not be revoked retroactively provided-there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts,
-there has been no change in the applicable law, and
-the taxpayer who received the ruling acted in good faith in reliance
upon the ruling and a retroactive revocation would be to his
detriment.
I would like to emphasize, however, that a letter ruling and this
reliance policy is good only to the taxpayer to whom the ruling was
issued. A taxpayer looking over the shoulder of another taxpayer
cannot rely on that ruling in consummating a similar transaction.
So now we have a taxpayer who has requested a ruling-has received
a favorable answer-has proceeded to consummate the transactionand has reported the tax result in his tax return. Now-what does the
Revenue Agent do when he audits the return?
First of all-the taxpayer should attach a copy of the ruling to his
tax return for the year in which the transaction was reported.
The agent is nevertheless instructed to see if the facts are correct
as they were presented in the request for the ruling.
If he finds the facts are substantially the same as those described in
the request for the ruling and that the transaction was carried out substantially as proposed, he will usually accept the ruling on its face.
However, if he finds the facts are substantially different and feels
the answer might have been different on the basis of the actual facts,
he refers it back to the National Office for reconsideration.
However, if he does this, it is considered as a request for Technical
Advice which means, among other things, that the taxpayer is entitled
to a conference on the issue in the National Office.
I see that my time is up, so I will save the story on procedures relating to requests for technical advice from our field offices to some later
occasion.

